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Even Immoral Governments Should Stop Torturing to Attract Investment 
Eleanor Healy-Birt, LL.M. Candidate at University of Chicago Law School 
  
Abstract 
Condemning torture is a universal norm of international law, yet it is still routinely 
practiced by many States around the world. We must face the fact that moral arguments 
have failed to eradicate this harm, and turn to other methods. Knowing that States may be 
indifferent to the damage they inflict upon individual people, but they are usually 
committed to economic development, we can see financial arguments in favour of ending 
torture should be persuasive. Investors should recognize torturing States as corrupt, 
unstable and inefficient, and hence a poor choice of place to run a business. If 
governments want to attract foreign investors to their development project, they must end 
torture and implement the rule of law. 
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 Several national and international legal instruments absolutely prohibit torture, including 
the U.N. Convention against Torture. Although it is often called an ‘offence to human dignity’,1 
torture is still widely practised, as many people believe it has countervailing benefits. Even 
though the ethical argument has failed to convince the world to abandon this abhorrent act, 
immoral governments should still stop torturing so they can attract much-needed foreign direct 
investment. This claim is built on three pillars. First, investors want to build businesses in States 
that are economically and politically stable. Second, torturing states cannot meet this criteria. 
Third, States are capable of changing their policies to encourage investment.  
Human rights and investment usually operate in separate spheres, with few attempts to 
make them work together2 as they are controlled by different actors. There is considerable 
literature on whether foreign direct investment itself respects or violates human rights.3 But 
whilst it would be pleasing to find investors can improve rights in employment and access to 
services, there is little they can do to prevent abuse perpetrated in areas outside their control, 
such as torture. Further, good-faith attempts to hold financial actors accountable for violations 
have proved extremely difficult as there are often complicated chains of money where 
obligations get lost.4 It would be unwise to abandon the project of using the immense power of 
                                                 
1
 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’, General Assembly resolution 3452, 9th 
December 1975. 
2
 Abdulla Al Faruque, ‘Mapping the Relationship between Investment Protection and Human Rights’ (2010) 11 
Journal of World Investment and Trade 539, 539. 
3
 See Matthis Sant’Ana, ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Human Development: Two Approaches for Assessing 
Impacts on Human Rights’ (2009) 3 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse 229. 
4
 Mary Dowell-Jones, ‘Financial Institutions and Human Rights’ (2013) 13 Human Rights Law Review 423, 441. 
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investment to improve human rights conditions. The challenge is to find a better way to enlist 
investors in the fight against torture than asking them to end abuses directly. 
The most successful strategies to bring the two fields together will only require 
governments and investors to work inside their domain of influence. As governments are the 
perpetrators of torture, only they can put a stop to it. At the same time, investors are not human 
rights experts, and should focus on what they are good at, which is identifying the business 
ventures they believe have the characteristics for success. Even if both the investor and the State 
are self-interested and indifferent to morality, their rational actions should lead to a reduction in 
torture. 
I. Investors Want a Stable and Predictable State 
A foreign investor will choose to start a business in a State where it believes it will make a 
return. There have been many studies examining which characteristics make investment more 
likely. One of the most important factors is the stability of a country’s economy.5 It should have 
a settled and strong consumer base, and have constant policies not affected that decision-makers 
cannot override with arbitrary preferences. Investors particularly look for States that have a 
strong monetary system, can control inflation, and have a legal regime that enables people to 
benefit from resources they own.6 
                                                 
5
 J. Durham, ‘Absorptive Capacity and the Effects of Foreign Direct Investment and Equity Foreign Portfolio 
Investment of Economic Growth’ (2004) 48 European Economic Review 285. 
6
 Manuchehr Irandoust, ‘A Survey of Recent Developments in the Literature of FDI-Led Growth Hypothesis’ (2010) 
11 Journal of World Investment and Trade 275, 278. 
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The quality of the labour force is also significant.7 Workers should be free to move to find 
job opportunities without fear of local authorities. The government must value its people enough 
to invest in their education.8 They need access to information so they can learn necessary skills 
follow economic developments. Residents should also be healthy enough to undertake long-term 
work.  
Another factor is the government’s ability to carry out economic reforms.9 The government 
must be capable of implementing its fiscal policies by controlling political and financial 
institutions. It should be able to monitor compliance by local officials and discipline those who 
disobey instructions. 
 
II. States that Torture Are Poor Choices for Investment 
A ‘torturing’ State is one where torture is practised with impunity. There is no country in the 
world which is completely free of torture, but there is a certainly a continuity of severity. The 
negative characteristics a State must adopt to torture, as outlined below, will increase in intensity 
where the practice is more widespread. There are also many kinds of torturing regimes, from 
those where instructions are issued at the highest level, to those where local police officers are 
out of control. The problems identified in this sections will apply to some situations better than 
others, but in all cases torture is evidence of a damaged government power to be avoided. 
 
                                                 
7
 D. Wheeler and A. Mody, ‘International Investment Location Decisions: The Case of US Firms’ (1992) 33 Journal 
of International Economics 57. 
8
 Georg Caspary and Susanne Berghau, ‘The Changing Nature of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing 
Countries: Evidence and Implications’ (2004) 5 Journal of World Investment and Trade 683, 689. 
9
 Pravakar Sahoo, ‘Determinants of FDI in South Asia: Role of Infrastructure, Trade Openness and Reforms’ (2012) 
13 Journal of World Investment and Trade 256, 276. 
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A. Inefficient and Failing Government 
Worrying about a government’s poor administration is increasingly common in international 
economic decisions. In recent decades, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have 
worried that programmes were failing because governments were too weak or inefficient to 
implement necessary structural changes. They consequently introduced “good governance” as an 
assessment criteria when deciding which projects to fund.10  The World Bank believes this has 
both an economic and social aspect, as respect for the rule of law will mean a consistent and 
accountable government that ensures human rights.11 There are many reasons for a potential 
investor to suspect that a government who tortures is corrupt and unstable. 
First, there is a gap between the government’s official statements and its real actions. 
Governments who routinely torture are turning to a practice which violates international and, 
almost certainly, domestic law. They are therefore experienced in using illegitimate ends to 
further their interests. This should worry investors, because even if the government promises 
them certain tax rules or resource licenses in legally-binding agreements, it may choose to 
override these whenever suitable to meet other policy objectives.  
Worse still, the investor may not realize what is happening until it is too late for them to 
mitigate their losses, as a torturing government is adept at hiding its actions. Investigators into 
torture prevention believe the absolute prohibition of torture and proliferation of monitoring 
mechanisms in international law has encouraged governments to hide information. They are now 
more adept at denying outsiders access to information and far less transparent in their accounts 
                                                 
10
 S. de la Harpe, C. Rijken and R. Rood, ‘Good Governance’ (2008) 11(2) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal. 
11
 World Bank, ‘Governance and Development’ (1992) available at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1992/04/440582/governance-development (last accessed 19th April 
2015). 
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of the legal system.12 This suggests that not only can they lie well when breaking promises, but 
they will also be able to mislead investors in advance by providing them with false information 
on their policies. 
Second, officials often commit torture according to personal whims, not fundamental policy 
objectives, and so they are arbitrary decision-makers who are vulnerable to corruption. An 
official may torture someone to obtain information about a crime they believe has been or will be 
committed. Moral and efficacy questions aside, this is a ‘rational’ action focused on obtaining an 
important result for the public. However, a Stage agent may also torture someone they do not 
like to intimidate them, as a form of discrimination.13 In this case, they have more discretion over 
their own actions and victims are substitutable. People will have more leverage to avoid torture 
by paying off officials. Any State that tortures in this way will be riddled with corruption, which 
is a problem for investors as they cannot rely on officials to provide them with promised 
resources and policies because someone else could buy them off.  
Third, a State that regularly uses torture is unstable because it feels threatened. States use 
torture to control the population, and to impress their power upon enemies inside the country and 
abroad.14  We know governments that public admit ill-treatment claim it is justified because they 
are targeting enemies of the state.15 If there really are serious threats to national security, an 
investor should beware as their property may not be properly protected. In a worst case scenario, 
                                                 
12
 Malcolm Evans and Rod Morgan, ‘Torture: Prevention versus Punishment?’ in Craig Scott, Torture as Tort: 
Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Hart 2001). 
13
 See Article 1, United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984). 
14
 Edward Peters, Torture (Basil Blackwell 1985). 
15
 Wolfgang Heinz, ‘The military, torture and human rights: Experience from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay’. In: Ronald Crelinsten and Alex Schmid (eds), The Politics of Pain: Torturers and their Masters 
(University of Leiden 1993) 73-108. 
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the government may fall, and fulfilling obligations to foreign investors is unlikely to be a high 
priority for a country in transition. If the threats are imagined, or invented to instil fear in the 
population, an investor should be suspicious of any information the government provides, and 
doubt the sincerity of its motives. 
Fourth, torture has a poor record in preventing crime, and shows the government has little 
interest in developing effective methods to reach its policy objectives. Torture takes place in 
secret and causes people to make statements whilst under severe mental and physical strain. It is 
impossible to monitor the interrogation techniques to see whether someone provided information 
of their own initiative, or was fed the answers the authorities wanted to hear. Anyone truly 
interested in finding perpetrators of a crime would not rely on statements made under torture.16  
Torture will create more destabilizing problems in society by alienating victims and leaving 
real offenders at large. A state that uses torture as part of crime control does not bother to 
investigate the efficacy of its policies and is prepared to create harm so it can appear to be doing 
good. This is not the attitude an investor wants from the government of the country it is choosing 
to invest in, as it needs to know the most efficient way to use its resources in the national legal 
and regulatory framework. The investor also needs the agencies to be capable of achieving 
promised results at the lowest cost. Consequently, even researchers who dispute the negative 
correlation between corruption and investment (as it is possible for an investor to successfully 
negotiate their way through a corruption network) accept that a State with poor-quality 
institutions will discourage investment inflows.17 
                                                 
16
 Jean Maria Arrigo, ‘A Utilitarian Argument Against Torture Interrogation of Terrorists’ (2004) 10 Science and 
Engineering Ethics 543. 
17
 Ali-Al-Sadif, ‘The Effects of Corruption on FDI Inflows’ 29 Cato J. (2009) 267. 
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Investors will not choose to work with governments that cannot be trusted, are expert liars, 
and privilege ineffective policies. They will worry about whether the State will fulfil its 
obligations in the investment agreement, and do not know whether their assets will be safe. As 
torturing governments are corrupt, unstable, and inefficient, investors should avoid them. 
 
B. Poor Quality Human Capital 
An investor needs good-quality local human capital, both to work directly in its business, and 
also for sub-contractors and suppliers. Local people may also be needed as consumers for 
internal sales. Torture severely damages human life, and destroys morale. It is also indicative of 
other human rights abuses, which can prevent people actively participating in business. Investors 
who know a State tortures should assume its human capital is damaged and send their investment 
elsewhere. 
Torture is a form of abuse and threatens people’s ability to work. Those who are tortured are 
physically injured after the incident, but they will also suffer long-term mental difficulties. These 
may include debilitating flashbacks of the terrible event, and cause mental illnesses, such as 
depression. These can either prevent people from working, or reduce the quality of their work. 
Further, the general population, regardless of whether they have been tortured, will have a poor 
relationship with employees. Torture causes people to mistrust figures of authority, and will 
make them more loyal, out of fear, to their own government that to their employer. This will 
make it difficult for an investor to encourage them to work at their most productive level, and 
makes the company vulnerable to threats by local officials. 
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Torturing states will also regularly violate other rights, which further diminishes the value of 
human capital. Investors prefer setting up businesses in countries where citizens enjoy civil and 
political rights.18 Modern business works better when citizens are able to freely communicate 
ideas and learn new skills.19 This means they should have freedom of expression and not be 
excluded from society, such as through arbitrary detention. Torture is one of the few human 
rights which has attained the level of jus cogens, which means there is now legally-recognized 
justification for violating the prohibition. If a State is prepared to abuse this right, it will certainly 
have no qualms in ignoring other ones. In fact, as it pursues torture as a form of population 
control, it will likely enlist other methods, such as censorship and imprisonment, to this end. 
When an investor sees a government tortures its people, it can be sure it is violating other 
essential rights, which means its potential employees will less skilled than those offered in other 
places. 
 
C. Unfair Dispute Resolution 
Whether a government tortures because it cannot stop local official’s abusing their power, or 
because it has a systematic policy of population control, its national courts will offer little 
protection against authorities acting unlawfully. Every investor needs to know their disputes can 
be settled, either through negotiation or litigation. If they cannot trust local dispute resolution, 
they know they will have to resort to arbitration, which may be investor-friendly, but really only 
                                                 
18
 David Law, ‘Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights’ 102 Northwester University Law Review 
(2008) 1277, 1318. 
19
 Philip Levy, ‘Economic Integration and Incipient Democracy’ American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, Working Paper No. 142 (26th March 2008). 
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suitable when a relationship has completely broken down. Investors will avoid places where 
small disputes during the period of operation will not be considered fairly. 
Torture may be a sign that the central authority in a State does not have effective control over 
local officials. Impunity for torture is often found even when a government wishes to end the 
practice because it lacks the resources or political will to force law enforcement to comply.20 
Disputes are more likely to arise because different layers of government do not work together 
with a unified strategy, and so an investor will receive conflicting instructions on how to 
proceed. It will be difficult to determine which version is binding, as no official is able to impose 
their will. An investor may then turn to the judiciary for answers and bring a case in a domestic 
court, or ask for an advisory opinion. Judges in torturing states are used to turning a blind eye to 
unlawful acts, so may be of little help in restraining government. It also beyond the competency 
of most judiciaries, even efficient ones, to impose policy decisions on government factions. 
On the other hand, a torturing state may be highly disciplined if systematic abuse is ordered 
from the top. This is just as problematic for the investor as there will be no one in the State with 
the power to condemn wrongful government acts. Torture is often characterized as a “crime of 
obedience” which proliferates when policies are effectively imposed through a chain of 
command.21 The legitimacy of a State depends on whether its actions are determinable and 
coherent.22 When the central authority is strong and it can make local government act with one 
voice, it gives the impression of legitimacy and there will be little support for challenging it in a 
                                                 
20
 Peter Burns and Sean McBurney, ‘Impunity and the U.N. Convention against Torture: A Shadow Play Without an 
Ending?’ in Scott (n 12). 
21
 Herbert C. Kelman, ‘The policy context of torture: A social-psychological analysis’ (2005) 87 International 
Review of the Red Cross 187. 
22
 Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (OUP 1990) 49. 
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court or other form of inquiry. An investor abused by this kind of government will find itself up 
against an impenetrable web of government support, making it impossible to resolve disputes at 
the national level. 
 
III. States Respond to Pressure from Investors 
Having explained investors have good reason to stay away from torturing States, it is now 
necessary to show investors actually do compare legal systems and governments can change 
internal policies to attract investment. This is why we want to convince investors to voice their 
dislike of torture, in the hope that States will change their practices, even if they do not care 
about the moral arguments against torture. 
Since World War II, economic prosperity has been touted as a means to improve human 
welfare. For example, the Consultative Board of the World Trade Organization directs its 
arguments for free trade at improving human life.23 We need not confine our optimism in this 
area to the direct benefits from the movement of wealth. In an inter-connected world, outside 
pressure and the temptation of growth will encourage States to open themselves up to 
intervention, and could force to improve respect for the rule of law and human rights as they 
compete for economic attention.  
Investors look into legal regimes when deciding where to spend their money. A 2008 study in 
the Suzhou Industrial Park in China found 88% of the 61 foreign respondents thought the legal 
                                                 
23
 Peter Sutherland et al., ‘The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium’ 
(2004) 10, available at http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/wro-symp05/future_WTO.pdf (last accessed 20th April 2015). 
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framework was highly important when deciding whether they should invest.24 Not only will they 
find the formal rules, such as a prohibition on torture, but they are also interested to see how the 
system operates. Over 60% of the Suzhou group had examined how written law was 
implemented,25 which means they want assurances that there is no corruption and there is 
effective dispute resolution. When asked why they felt confident in China, 40% said it was 
because of the legal protection it offered, or political stability.26 States which offer better 
protection and even greater stability, as evidence by low torture practice, would be an even 
greater draw for investors. 
States want to attract investment to accelerate their economic development. The government 
can earn money by offering its resources to foreign businesses, and it can then use this revenue to 
run projects of its own and improve provision for local people. States can also delegate 
development projects to investors as it can rely on them to build roads, energy supplies and other 
infrastructure to supply their business, which then allow local start-ups to flourish.27 The 
government may even require an investor to provide extra services for access to the country, 
including building schools and hospitals. It is not surprising that countries compete for these 
advantages, and we can therefore expect them to seek to improve their desirability as host 
States.28 
                                                 
24
 Wenhua Shan and Sheng Zhang, ‘FDI in China and the Role of Law: An Empirical Approach’ (2011) 22 Journal 
of World Investment and Trade 457, 461-462. 
25
 Ibid. 463. 
26
 Ibid. 467. 
27
 Theodore Moran, Foreign Direct Investment  and Development: The New Policy Agenda for Developing Counties 
nd Economies in Transition (Peterson Institute 1998) 1- 9. 
28
 Sharon Jackson and Stefan Markowski, ‘The Attractiveness of Countries to Foreign Direct Investment’ (1995) 29 
Journal of World Trade 159, 161. 
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China provides an excellent example of a State that was prepared to make significant changes 
to attract foreign direct investment. At the World Investment Forum in 2010, the Chinese Vice 
President explained that foreign companies brought over half the country’s technology imports 
and a fifth of its tax revenues.29 Investment has been very important in China’s development and 
it has worked hard to accommodate it. For example, it realized foreign investors wanted better 
legal protection of their assets, so it introduced legal doctrines to meet outside expectations.30 
The private transfer and lease of land had not been part of its legal system since 1949 and 
property transfers had to be mediated through the State. In response to foreign investors seeking 
rights similar to those of ownership that they were familiar with from their home jurisdictions, 
China allowed foreign companies to buy rights of use to land.31   
 Some people suggest investors prefer to work with governments who do not have high 
human rights ambitions, but this does not mean they would prefer a torturing government. 
Investment agreements often include ‘stabilization clauses’ to prevent governments changing 
laws and regulations that will diminish an investment’s value. It is arguable that these clauses 
could be used to prevent State’s implementing human rights reforms that would reduce the 
amount a company could earn by exploiting workers.32 The existence of such clauses is, 
however, compatible with torture avoidance. Investors do not want to be abused by volatile 
authorities,33 and a torturing government is likely to be dishonest and aggressive so should be 
                                                 
29
 Cited in Shan and Zhang (n24), 458. 
30
 John Zhengdong Huan, ‘An Introduction to Foreign Investment Laws in the People’s Republic of China’ (1994-
1995) 28 John Marshall Law Review 471, 472. 
31
 Ibid., 484. 
32
 Titus Edjua and Anthony Crockett, ‘Human Rights Not Negotiable’ (2008-2010) 28 International Financial Law 
Review 50, 50. 
33
 Ibid.  
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shunned. Further, even if investors dislike the changes caused by human rights improvements 
during the operating period of their business, they would like a system which respects the rule of 




 Torture is an abhorrent practice which is evidence of blatant disregard for the rule of law. 
Investors want to run businesses in stable, efficient States with high-quality human capital and 
effective means of resolving disputes. States who want to further their economic development by 
attracting foreign investors need to stop torturing so they can prove they are a suitable 
environment for commercial growth. Even if we pessimistically believe States and investors are 
immoral or indifferent to ethical arguments, we can still persuade governments to end torture. 
 
